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RANDY BORUM, ROBERT FEIN, BRYAN VOSSEKUIL,
MICHAEL GELLES, and SCOTT SHUMATE
The Role of Operational Research in
Counterterrorism
In the post 11 September 2001 security environment, federal, state, and local
law enforcement personnel in the United States are asked regularly to
maintain a state of ‘‘heightened alert.’’1 Intelligence professionals have also
been mobilized to increase data collection and information-sharing eﬀorts
to prevent terrorist attacks against U.S. interests.2,3,4 But understanding
the threat of the ‘‘new terrorism’’ and its implications for investigation and
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intelligence analysis can be vexing, even for the most thoughtful and
experienced professionals.5
Those in the law enforcement, defense, and intelligence communities whose
jobs have involved anti- and counterterrorism eﬀorts are now confronting a
new type of adversary.6 From the end of World War II through the end of
the Cold War, terrorist groups and activities were driven primarily by
nationalistic interests. Most of these terrorists had similar, classic patterns:
they belonged to discreet groups with hierararchical command structures;
clearly deﬁned ideology and objectives; were relatively small in number; and
struck selectively and primarily at targets selected for their symbolic value,
rather than their potential to maximize casualties. After an attack, the group
responsible would most often identify itself and state the reason for the
violent act. As Bruce Hoﬀman has so aptly stated: ‘‘However disagreeable or
repugnant the terrorists and their tactics may have been, we at least knew
who they were and what they wanted.’’7
Al-Qaeda and the transnational terrorist groups of the present, however,
are motivated and operate much diﬀerently than the stereotypical groups of
the past.8 There is a command structure for al-Qaeda’s small, but eﬀective
core, and a decentralized outer band, that is level and variant to control
and autonomy. Unlike past terrorist groups, al-Qaeda has the strength of
numbers, with cells represented in multiple countries worldwide, and their
technical training and sophistication are far greater. Targets are selected
with varying discrimination, from symbolic to economic and opportunistic,
and accessibility and tactics are chosen to increase the magnitude and scope
of lethality.9 Al-Qaeda’s leadership has gone to great lengths to adopt the
linear model of thinking and problem solving that is readily found in
Western doctrine, and which counters their otherwise more natural
associative thinking patterns. Killing is no longer the incidental outcome of
an attack; it is the central purpose of the attack.10 Al-Qaeda’s objectives
and ideologies remain much more elusive, in that there is less attributed
connection between the chosen action and the stated cause.11
Just as war planners must adapt to the evolving threats of combat, so too
must those concerned with national security recognize that these new
terrorist threats are not just another handful of nails waiting to be driven
by the nation’s trusty hammers of force and diplomacy.12 The threat of
terrorism to national and international security has evolved and is
continuing to evolve. Eﬀorts to contain and eﬀectively terminate this threat
must transform to adapt to these changes.
CONTEMPORARY THREAT ENVIRONMENT
In analyzing the threat from the new transnational terrorists, some scholars
of military operations have drawn parallels with elements of ‘‘fourth
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generation warfare’’13 and ‘‘asymmetric warfare.’’14 Brieﬂy, the concept of
fourth generation warfare (4GW) comes from an analysis that modern
warfare (post–Industrial Revolution) has evolved through four phases.15
The ﬁrst phase was characterized by dominant use of the smoothbore long
gun deployed with ‘‘line and column’’ tactics. Combat eﬀectiveness
depended on mass of manpower and rate of ﬁre. A second generation
emerged with the development of the riﬂe-barrel musket, and was
enhanced by automatic machine guns and artillery. As a result of these
technological advances, the ﬁrepower of an assault no longer depended on
massive manpower. Tactically, troops would advance—usually now in
small groups—after an infusion of ﬁrepower attacks. This shifted the
mode of confrontation. Battles were no longer waged between two lines of
armed combatants standing face-to-face, engaging in direct ﬁre on the
battleﬁeld. The foundation for (but not implementation of ) third
generation warfare was ﬁrmly in place by World War I. Armament
technology continued to advance; but signiﬁcantly, ideas and strategy also
gained ascending importance in operational planning.
The major third generation of development was a shift toward maneuver
warfare. That is, troops gained advantage over an enemy not simply by
destroying them and reducing their numbers (attrition), but rather by
maneuvering around their defenses and inﬁltrating with less direct
confrontation.
The fourth generation trends are driven largely by ideas, with radical
changes to the concepts of both combat and combatants. Lind,
Nightengale, Schmitt, Sutton, and Wilson, authors of the seminal work on
4GW, state that the goal is to collapse the enemy internally, rather than to
defeat him physically. They describe its manifestation as follows:
In broad terms, fourth generation warfare seems likely to be widely
dispersed and largely undeﬁned; the distinction between war and peace
will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to
the point of having no deﬁnable battleﬁelds or fronts. The distinction
between ‘‘civilian’’ and ‘‘military’’ may disappear. Actions will occur
concurrently throughout all participants’ depth, including their society
as a cultural, not just a physical, entity.16
Although written in 1989, this formulation describes the contemporary
operational mode of al-Qaeda and other contemporary transnational
terrorist groups.17 In fact, in a remarkably prescient hypothetical, Lind
et al. ponder the potential challenges to the U.S. were terrorists to use
existing technology combined with the following elements:
 A non-national or transnational base, such as an ideology or religion.
 A direct attack on the enemy’s culture.
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 Highly sophisticated psychological warfare, especially through manipulation of
the media, particularly television news.18
Fourth generation warfare is not necessarily terrorism, but terrorists do
appear to be using 4GW strategy and tactics.19 An eﬀective counterterrorism
response will need to be driven by good intelligence.20
Intelligence has been deﬁned broadly as ‘‘the product resulting from the
collecting and processing of information concerning actual and potential
situations and condition relating to domestic and foreign activities and to
domestic and foreign or US and enemy-held areas.’’21 Among its objectives
are the acquisition of facts about, and an understanding of the adversary’s
goals, intent, methods, and capacities. This new framework for action
calls for new strategies from intelligence agencies that monitor and assess
extremists; from law enforcement agencies that observe, record, and
investigate their behavior; and from military and defense agencies
attempting to contain or eliminate them. In countering operational tactics
that rely heavily on strategic analysis and psychological eﬀect, behavioral
research has a clear role to inform those eﬀorts, but only if those research
products are operationally relevant.
PSYCHOLOGICAL VS. OPERATIONAL RELEVANCE
While much has been written about the ‘‘psychology of terrorism,’’ many
questions remain.22 Particularly important are questions that have
operational relevance—those that can inﬂuence the thinking and action of
organizations and individuals with responsibility to disrupt and destroy
terrorists networks. For example, terrorism expert Martha Crenshaw notes
that tensions have arisen from policymakers’ insistence on the possibility
of a ﬁxed and unambiguous ‘‘terrorist proﬁle,’’ a list of characteristics that
permit identiﬁcation of actual or potential terrorists.23 There is also debate
about whether terrorism is best understood as a form of psychopathology
or as a strategic choice.24 Numerous mental health professionals have
sought to explain terrorist behavior in conventional psychiatric terms,
mainly by posing theory-laden hypotheses.25
Whether terrorists collectively suﬀer from paranoia or wallow in
narcissism seems, however, to be of little operational signiﬁcance to
investigators, intelligence analysts, case oﬃcers, military operatives, or
defense planners. The guiding principle for any behavioral research that
seeks to inform questions of homeland or national security is not
whether the study question is psychologically interesting or relevant,
but whether it is operationally relevant. Viewed this way, behavioral
research may be responsive to the needs of those with operational
responsibilities.
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An Example of Operationally Relevant Research in Practice
In the early 1990s Robert Fein and Bryan Vossekuil—working at the time
for the U.S. Secret Service—pioneered a strategy for conducting
operationally relevant behavioral research. Around that time, several cases
had come to the attention of the Secret Service that raised questions about
conventional wisdom regarding assassins and assassination behavior. For
example, the frequent assumption was that a person seeking to assassinate
a U.S. President would be (a) motivated by mental illness; (b) ﬁrst
communicate a threat to the target; (c) have a grievance or feelings of
animosity toward the target; and, therefore, (d) have a focused, single
direction of interest. But the cases that had come to attention, although
quite serious, did not ﬁt that preconceived pattern. This led the Secret
Service to reexamine its assumptions about assassination behavior and the
way in which it assessed potential threats to its protectees.26
Fortunately, assassination is a very rare phenomenon, so the initial
research challenge was to determine how to systematically study such an
infrequent event. Fein and Vossekuil chose to focus on incidents in which
one or more individuals had attacked—or approached with lethal intent—
a public ﬁgure, chosen for the attack because of his=her public status. For
the method of inquiry, they developed a modiﬁed, intensive case study
approach. Using a structured codebook, they examined the patterns of
thinking and behavior of all 83 persons known to have attacked or come
close to attacking a person of public status in the U.S. over the preceding
ﬁfty years. The choice to focus on ‘‘patterns of thinking and behavior’’
was deliberate. The objective was not to determine ‘‘what makes people
become assassins’’; rather, it was to examine whether there were discernible
behaviors that were known, or knowable in advance, that could
have marked a pathway toward a planned violent act. If so, these markers
might help investigators prevent future attacks. The study, called the
Exceptional Case Study Project (ECSP), focused on seven operationally
relevant questions:27
 How do attackers develop the idea to assassinate a public oﬃcial or public ﬁgure,
and move from idea to action?
 What is the range of motives for assassination?
 How do attackers select their target(s)?
 How do attackers plan for the attack?
 What do attackers communicate to anyone about their ideas or intent prior to
the attack?
 What role, if any, does mental illness play in motivating or implementing an
attack?
 Are there key life factors that play any role in motivating or implementing an
attack?
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A systematic investigation of these questions produced several surprising
ﬁndings that challenged the prevailing assumptions about assassination.
Mental illness was not a critical factor. Most attackers and near-attackers
did not harbor a grievance or animosity toward the target. Many had
considered multiple targets (multiple directions of interest). And none of
the persons who actually mounted an attack against a public ﬁgure had
communicated a prior threat to the target. The ﬁndings called for a
radically diﬀerent approach to assessing and managing threats to public
ﬁgures, including Secret Service protectees.28 Conceived in an operational
environment, translating ECSP ﬁndings into recommendations for how
that process could be improved was not diﬃcult.
Principles of Operationally Relevant Research
The ECSP and its approach were distinguished by the fact that the empirical
inquiry was driven by a need to inform key investigative and protective—
rather than scientiﬁc, psychological, or sociological—questions. The same
method can be applied to other acts of planned, lethal aggression,
including those that pose a threat to homeland or U.S. national security.
Fein and Vossekuil coined the term ‘‘targeted violence’’ to describe those
situations where an identiﬁed or identiﬁable perpetrator has come to
oﬃcial attention, raising the question of a potential threat to an identiﬁed
or identiﬁable target(s).29 Many diverse acts of violence fall within that
broad deﬁnition. In fact, some of the horriﬁc shootings occurring in
schools in recent years could also be viewed as a form of targeted violence.
Consequently, the operationally relevant ECSP methodology was applied
to those incidents, again leading to some compelling and illuminating
results, with direct implications for school safety.30 To achieve this level of
relevance, however, requires rigorous adherence to certain principles in the
design, implementation, and analysis of the research study.
First, the research endeavor must be operationally informed. The design of
the inquiry must begin with an understanding of the key ultimate questions
that end users (e.g., investigators, intelligence analysts, defense, and security
decisionmakers, etc.) routinely are required to answer, the threshold
decisions they are required to address, and the environment in which that
process occurs. For example, an investigator may need to know: ‘‘Does
this person (or groups) pose a threat to U.S. assets or interests, and if so,
what kind of threat?’’ That analysis may occur in an operational context
where the investigator is aware of many persons and groups in the
jurisdiction that espouse some kind of extremist ideology and potentially
violent rhetoric. Having extreme beliefs and ideas, per se, is not
uncommon, nor is it a crime. Moreover, all people with extremist ideas
cannot be assumed to pose a similar type and level of threat to U.S.
interests. Therefore, generating knowledge that an investigator can use and
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apply to answer a key question of threat assessment requires an
understanding of the operational context.
Similarly, the research plan should take into account the process of
investigation and analysis typically applied to the problem, including
what kinds and sources of data or information are available to the
decisionmaker.31 Because the goal is to develop information that will
inform operational questions and activities, the study should be conceived
and crafted in a way that is consonant with the procedures and language
of those who will use or apply it.32 Accordingly, having operational
personnel involved at every phase of the study plan and implementation is
helpful.
Second, the study should maintain a behavior-based focus. When
exploring the realm of terrorism or other violent behavior, speculating
about the personality or internal dynamics of the actors may seem
intriguing or even tempting.33 These questions, though perhaps having
some theoretical or even scientiﬁc merit, are unlikely to produce
operationally relevant ﬁndings, for at least two reasons:
(1) Individual personality factors tend not to be the causes that best explain violent
behavior, nor do they help reliably to distinguish ‘‘terrorists’’ from ‘‘non-
terrorists,’’ and
(2) This type of information tends not to be routinely known or ‘‘knowable’’ to
investigators or analysts examining a potential threat.
For example, in the past, some experts have argued that one form of
‘‘terrorist psychopathology’’ arises from an individual’s developmental
failure to psychologically separate and individuate from his or her
parents.34 Even if investigators and analysts could reliable determine what
that means, information would not likely be readily available about
whether a person of investigative interest has successfully navigated the
developmental task of separation-individuation. Maintaining a behavioral
focus in the study, therefore, enhances operational utility and leads to
more speciﬁc threat assessment indicators.
Third, the interpretation or lessons from the study must derive from an
analysis of incident-related behaviors. This means that facts should drive
conclusions. Those designing and analyzing the research should recognize
that preconceived notions, assumptions, or conventional wisdom may be
wrong. A major objective of research is to submit ideas and hypotheses to
critical scrutiny. Operational research should set aside preconceptions
about what ‘‘causes’’ the behavior, and redirect interest to what behaviors
precede the outcome. The approach used in ECSP and related studies was
to ‘‘work backwards from the incident to the idea.’’ By beginning with the
outcome—such as an attack incident—it is possible to trace backwards
the progression of tasks and behaviors that were necessary to accomplish
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the act. These incident-related behaviors will be the most speciﬁc and reliable
indicators of planning or preparing for an attack.
ADVANTAGES OF A RESEARCH-BASED APPROACH
To believe that one can learn from experience is not diﬃcult or particularly
controversial. Accepting that premise, the question then becomes: What kind
of experience will lead to prevention and how can lessons best be learned
and developed from that experience? Anecdotes and case studies are
used routinely in law enforcement, military training, and in the academic
ﬁeld of strategic studies.35 Some distinct advantages can be gained from
relying on a methodical analysis of multiple cases, rather than drawing
general conclusions based on a single case.36
The ﬁrst advantage is that the analysis is systematic.* With anecdotal
accounts, knowing how best to extract the lessons from the narrative is
often diﬃcult. This is true even if multiple cases are anecdotally examined.
Diﬀerent preincident behaviors or contextual factors may be more readily
apparent in some cases than in others. For example, a terrorist target may
appear to be drawn directly from the al-Qaeda training manual, while
another may not. But the common behavioral element may have been that
all potential targets of a particular type or in a particular region were
surveilled and assessed prior to selection. Clearly, that lesson would have
implications beyond a conclusion that consulting the training manual to
determine which targets should be hardened or monitored is advisable.
Systematic observation across multiple incidents facilitates this broader
view.37
The second advantage, a result of systematic observation, is that the
analysis can reveal patterns, deviations, and possible cluster or typologies
of the studied behavior. Explaining and applying ﬁndings from behavioral
research is easier when they can be analyzed and presented within some
type of conceptual framework. Gathering the same information, on the
same behaviors, deﬁned in the same way, across diﬀerent cases, allows
enough variability that the phenomenon (e.g., terrorists attacks) more
generally can be deconstructed into its component parts. Single cases may
*The ECSP and related case-series studies of relatively rare events are based on a systematic
method of empirical inquiry. We draw a distinction between a systematic method of inquiry
and the more traditional scientiﬁc method. The scientiﬁc method aspires to derive
knowledge from true experimental studies with random assignment and proper controls for
all potentially confounding variables. Given the nature of the events of interest in an
operational context, it is often impossible or impractical to design and conduct a study
within such narrow parameters.
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be idiosyncratic and anomalous, not lending themselves well to inference of
trends or more general principles.38
APPLICATIONS OF BEHAVIOR-BASED OPERATIONAL RESEARCH
Once a study has been conducted, how might the ﬁndings and lessons be
applied to operational tasks? The National Commission Report on
Terrorism concluded that: ‘‘the best weapon against international terrorism
is good intelligence.’’ Information from operational research can best be
used to inform the collection, analysis, and dissemination of protective
intelligence, and the assessment and management of potentially threatening
situations.
Information Gathering
An operational research analysis can identify speciﬁc behaviors that might
suggest planning or preparation for an attack. State and local law
enforcement personnel, serving on the front line of America’s homeland
defense, have as one of their many roles to serve as the ‘‘eyes and ears’’ of
the intelligence community.39 They often are in a better position than
federal oﬃcials to observe suspicious and attack-related behaviors in the
community. To execute that role eﬀectively, however, they need to know
what speciﬁc behaviors to look for and what should be a source of
concern.40 A behavior-based, operational analysis of past attacks and
attempts can identify mechanisms for target selection, surveillance,
communication, intelligence gathering, subverting security, and acquiring
and preparing weapons to help front-line data gatherers focus and
organize their observations.41
Intelligence Analysis
Research results can suggest not only speciﬁc behaviors to look for, but also
ways to organize the incoming information. As noted, an advantage of
research—deﬁned here as systematic observation across multiple cases—is
that it can reveal patterns of activity and deviations from those patterns.
By understanding the patterns and sequences of preattack activity,
investigators will have a reﬁned set of guiding questions that frame the
analysis of threat-related information. Questions arising from research
might include: How are targets selected? What information is gathered
about potential targets prior to the attack? How is that information
gathered? How are the means of the attack chosen? How are they
acquired? How many people are involved? What are their roles? How do
they communicate? In this way, analysts can interpret incoming
information in relation to other information, patterns, and past events.
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Resource Deployment
A key challenge in homeland security planning is to determine how best to
deploy limited resources. All persons or groups of potential concern
cannot be constantly monitored. All potential targets cannot be maximally
hardened and continuously watched. Planners must decide what kind of
preventive resources have the greatest likelihood of deterring certain types
of attacks against certain types of targets.42
Operational research can help to guide these resource deployment
decisions. Research results point to patterns in terrorist target selection
and attack planning that can be combined with data from vulnerability
assessments to produce a more comprehensive plan of defense and
asset protection. Homeland defense strategies and activities are
dynamic, and should change constantly to adapt to the evolving threat
environment.43 Defensive maneuvers should track and lead these
oﬀensive=attack maneuvers. A systematic knowledge of enemy (terrorist)
planning and operations can lead to more informed security plans and
decisions.
Identi¢cation of Critical Inter-System Relationships
Operational research, as described here, focuses on facts and behaviors that
are known or knowable prior to the attack. But diﬀerent facts can come from
diﬀerent sources. A third application of research results is to identify the
source of critical information. Knowing this source helps national security
and homeland defense planners identify the key agencies and systems to
involve in information sharing, intelligence analysis, and security
development.44
Information Integration
Sometimes, after a terrorist attack has occurred, and the incident has been
thoroughly and critically reviewed, the evidence of planning and
preparation seems abundantly clear. Comprehending why the attack was
not foreseen and prevented may be diﬃcult. A distinct advantage of
retrospective analysis, however, is that, after the fact, all critical
information is known, collated, and analyzed in light of the known
outcome. This, typically, is not the case in an ongoing investigation or
threat assessment. Some pieces of the puzzle may be missing. Some pieces
may be held by persons or agencies that are not sharing or even
communicating with others.45 And, at this early stage, no one with any of
the pieces knows the outcome or what the end product will look like.
Operational research can capitalize on those retrospective advantages and
apply them to prospective analyses. It can suggest better questions to direct
the investigation. It can give guidance to investigators and analysts about
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what kind of relevant information may be known or knowable prior to an
attack, where such information may be located and corroborated, and how
pieces of information may ﬁt together. For example, an analysis of past
attacks by a particular group may ascertain that a certain level of chatter
between individuals of investigative concern was often followed by a
transfer of money in certain increments into known accounts. This
monetary transfer was followed closely by activity that built capacity for
the attacks, such as weapons acquisition, technical training, production of
false documents, etc. A piece of information integrated with other
information often takes on a new—and perhaps more signiﬁcant—
meaning. One way that research ﬁndings can be used as an operational
tool is to help specify the relevant pieces of the puzzle, point to where they
might be found, and how they might relate to one another.
THE NEED FOR RELEVANCE
The current threat to United States interests posed by terrorism is
considerably diﬀerent—and arguably more lethal—than in the past.
Terrorists are taking advantage of new technology and becoming more
strategically sophisticated, often intentionally applying asymmetric
maneuvers and elements of fourth generation warfare. The nature of this
threat requires a U.S. response that is intelligence-driven and uses
information eﬀectively.
Research analyses of past plans, operations, and attacks can assist in
this eﬀort, but only if the studies are planned and conducted with an
emphasis on operational relevance. That requires that research questions,
design, and analyses be informed by a thorough understanding of the
key issues and tasks that end-users (e.g., investigators and analysts) are
required to address and the process by which their inquiries are
conducted.
The study approach developed by Fein and Vossekuil in their operational
analysis of assassination behavior—the Exceptional Case Study Project—
serves as both an exemplar and a road map for examining other acts of
aggression against U.S. assets and interests. Using that operational
research approach over the more traditional single case study allows the
examination to be more systematic and perhaps identify patterns, trends,
and deviations that may not otherwise be apparent.
Applying this research method to cases of terrorism could produce
ﬁndings that would help to guide information gathering, intelligence
analysis, resource deployment, identiﬁcation of inter-systems relationships,
and information integration. Those advances should lead to a more
eﬀective use of information in the intelligence-driven war against the new
terrorism.
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